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The prevailing wisdom is that the more knowledgeable has a clearer crystal ball to 
predict the future. However, in the showbiz world, no one knows what the future 
of an artist might develop into or if there would even be a future. It is all up to 
the Nature. When God chooses to bless him, he makes a fortune. Even the world's 
grandest studios could not guess the biggest hit in the business. For example, the 
Universal studios turned down the production of Star Wars (George Lucas, 1977), 
and ultimately Twentieth Century Fox picked up this seemingly skeptical film. Sur-
prising or unsurprisingly, the trilogies became a blockbuster, and both the studio and 
the scriptwriter earned an empire. Years later, Columbia refused to produce E. T. 
(Steven Spielberg, 1982), while Universal aspired to it and earned back the empire 
from disowning Star Wars. William Goldman (1996), a famous American screen-
writer, explains these interesting anecdotes on Broadway and in Hollywood with a 
famous quote--"Nobody knows anything". Later Caves (2000) formally addressed it 
as one of the axiomatic properties in the entertainment industry. By the time the 
reader has finished the paper, it is my hope that the reader will understand a little 
bit more about the relationship between this interesting feature and the structure of 
contracts in the show business. 
Revenue share and contract length are common provisions of an entertainment 
contract. Although share and duration are some verifiable variables that can be 
included in contracts, other crucial elements of the showbiz world such as the man-
ager's specific investments are difficult to be documented. Some questions of interest 
that naturally arise are: how do the verifiable variables, such as revenue share and 
contract duration, affect the investment incentive of the manager? We observe that 
artists seldom make significant achievement once they exit the entertainment world. 
Why do talents usually have small outside opportunity? Would a suitable choice 
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of contract enforcement rectify these problems?1 The purpose of this paper is to 
address these questions formally with a simple two-period model. 
It is often claimed that long-term contracts can improve investment incentive. 
True, when investments are relationship-specific, which means that the value within 
the trading relationship exceeds the value of outside trading opportunity, one party 
can extract some or all surplus, as investments have little or no value without the 
party's own participation. As a result, the investing party has lower incentive to 
invest. For example in the show business, the manager may invest specifically on an 
artist, such as talent development, promotion and match-making between artists and 
complementary inputs. The manager's return will be lowered or entirely lost if the 
artist was to trade with an outsider. The manager may therefore put less investment 
than is appropriate. The conventional wisdom says that long-term contracts are 
more likely to provide the correct ex ante incentive for the manager to exert high 
effort when relationship-specific investments are at stake: looking up the artist for 
a longer period of time prevent him from trading with another party. But that is 
hardly the whole story. 
There are two countervailing forces in assessing the implementation of long-term 
contracts. On the one hand, long-term contracts improve incentive to invest as they 
ensure the manager has a longer time to reap the return from his investment. On 
the other hand, long-term contracts allow the manager to wait less costly until more 
accurate signal arrives before making investment decisions. The longer the duration 
of a contract, the less costly it is for the manager to employ such a "wait-and-see" 
strategy. Hence, it may weaken the manager's incentive to put high effort on his 
artist in early periods of contract term. The literature has examined the former 
effect and yield important insights into the factors that affect contract duration, but 
1 In fact, finding a suitable contractual enforcement is examined by many scholars. My study 
question is particularly similar to that analyzed by Tao and Wang (1998) . Under the condition 
that local firms can learn some know-how from a foreign firm and establish a business on his own, 
they show that a non-binding contract is preferred by both the foreign and the local firms. 
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issues about the "wait-and-see" strategy have not been discussed extensively. 
In fact given the breadth of the literature on contract theory, it may seem sur-
prising that the dynamic perspective on contracting has a rather short history and 
has not been discussed extensively. The major interest of the earlier literature stems 
from the simplicity of the contracts studied, which are single-period (see Azariadis 
(1975) and Baily (1977)). Later economists have continued the study of multi-period 
contracts, but the model is virtually silent about the endogenous nature of contract 
duration (see Harris and Holmstrom (1982)). More recent researches paid atten-
tion to investigate the issue of contract length per se. For instance, Gray (1978) 
found contract duration decreases with the level of uncertainty but increases with 
the costs of recontracting. Dye (1985a and 1985b ), assuming risk neutrality, analyzed 
the optimal length of contract and the factors that affect such length. Harris and 
Holmstrom (1987) studied the relationship between costs of recontracting and con-
tract duration and that between the noisiness of state process and contract length. 
Laffont and Tirole (1988) examined the ratchet effect in a dynamic principal-agent 
setting. Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) discussed short-term contracts 
and long-term agency relationships, and identified the particular circumstances un-
der which short-term contracts are sufficient. But these models did not attempt 
to justify how the ''wait-and-see" strategy will affect investment incentive in early 
periods of a long-term contract. In this paper I hope to fill in some of these gaps. 
I turn to a brief outline of the analysis I will pursue. Section 2 introduces the 
setup of the model and highlights the model's special linkage with the property of 
"nobody knows" in the showbiz world. In the model, neither the artist himself 
nor the manager knows how likely the artist's talent "click" with the audience, i.e. 
nobody knows how likely the team will succeed. To begin with, I use a single-period 
model to study the implications of revenue share and a simple two-period model to 
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address the dynamic issue.2 Under a revenue-sharing contract, the manager chooses 
a first-period level of effort. The artist's performance depends on his talent and 
the manager's effort. In the second period, after observing the artist's first-period 
performance, the manager updates his belief about the talent of the artist and exerts 
effort accordingly. Finally, I reinstate the bargaining stage to study the implications 
of outside opportunity. 
Section 3 presents a single-period model and draws some implications of revenue 
share. The main result is that revenue share may deteriorate incentive to invest. The 
result should not be surprising because leaving some money in the artist's pocket 
would mean the manager has to bear all the effort costs with a smaller purse, and 
this may blunt his incentive to exert high effort. 
Section 4 analyzes the two-period version of this model and draws some implica-
tions of contract duration. I find a ''wait-and-see" strategy will not deteriorate the 
first-period incentive of the manager to invest specifically on the artist. This result 
is consistent with the conventional wisdom. 
Section 5 extends the model to a two-sided game, which the artist can decide 
to accept or refuse the manager's proposal. I show that an artist is willing to give 
up a large share of revenue to the manager if doing so is more likely to induce the 
manager to put effort on him. The intuition is straightforward: the artist knows 
that the manager will put more effort on him only when the manager can extract 
a greater share. This result seems a good approximation for the behavior of novice 
artists in the showbiz world. Moreover, I conjecture that low investment incentive 
of the manager may cause the employment of too many mediocrities that have small 
outside opportunity. This result echoes that of Tervio (2008). He shows that the 
workforce in the entertainment industry is plagued with too many mediocre workers. 
2Following the tradition, I term the principal as the proposer of the contract, i.e. the manager, 
and the party that accepts or rejects the contract as the agent, i.e. the artist. 
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As a result, the industry's output is inefficiently lower and better suited talents 
receive excessive returns. 
2 The Model 
The leitmotif of my model is to formally incorporate the "nobody knows" property 
in the entertainment business as discussed in Caves (2000).3 Precisely, this property 
means that, on the consumption side, little is known about the size of pie before 
actual sales, as creative product is an "experience good" that cannot be reliably 
assessed by buyers without consuming it. For instance, buyers cannot evaluate a 
song without actually hearing it and they also cannot evaluate a movie without 
actually watching it. It is usually the "click" between the artist's type and the 
buyer's taste that determines the success of a creative product, which can hardly be 
observed ex ante. On the production side, the future of an artist is difficult to predict 
because neither auditions nor the level of specific investments on the artists seem 
to play a large role in learning the type of artist. There is simply no objective ex 
ante measure of someone's potential in the entertainment business and it seems that 
the history of success of an artist's past projects is the only reliable assessment. For 
instance, who would have predicted that Slumdog Millionaire (Danny Boyle, 2008), 
which was produced by an Indian crew of students and so far anonymous actors, 
would be nominated for ten Oscar Academy Awards in 2009 and actually swept 
eight awards from the ceremony? Who would have predicted that the performance 
of "I Dreamed a Dream" by Susan Boy le on Britain's Got Talent (third series, 2009) 
would attract global interest? Nobody knows anything in this industry. 
3The slogan "nobody knows anything" is originated by Goldman (1996) . Later Caves (2000) for-
mally studied several axiomatic properties in the entertainment industry such as "nobody knows", 
"art for art's sake", "horizontal differentiation" and "o-rings production function" . Similar to 
Goldman, he puts the "nobody knows" property high on the agenda. 
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To highlight this property, first consider a two-period contracting problem be-
tween a risk-neutral manager and a risk-neutral artist. After a contract is mutually 
agreed, the manager (M) and the artist (A) team up to produce. For simplicity, I as-
sume that they agree on a relatively simple linear contract which stipulates revenue 
share and contract length only.4 These provisions are both observable and verifi-
able by a third party such as the court. They can thus be stipulated in a contract 
which can be enforced with appropriate penalties if either the manager or the artist 
breaches the agreement. Define the contract space as C E {share, duration}, where 
share E [0, 1) and duration E {1, 2}. 
A's type, denoted by t, is of two types: either high (h) or low (l), i.e. t E {h, l}.5 
Type h means the artist is more likely to be favored by the audience relative to 
type l. Both the manager and the artist do not know which type the artist belongs 
to. Hence, the model formalizes the ''nobody knows" property. Nevertheless, the 
manager and the artist share a common belief about the type of talent: A is of type 
h and type l with probabilities A and 1 - A respectively, where A E [0, 1]. 
If indeed the audience favors the artist, the team would be successful, in which 
the team generates a payoff. I treat this payoff as the numeraire and normalize its 
size to 1. Otherwise, the team is referred to as unsuccessful and the team generates 
a lower payoff for which I normalize to zero. The team's odd of success depends 
not only on the artist's type, but also on how much effort the manager put on the 
artist. For instance, the manager can pay more attention to matching the right set 
of jobs to the artist. The manager, given that he is more knowledgeable on what 
the audience would like, would be able to train the artist in a certain way to better 
4 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that if the compensation paid is a function of profits 
only, then linear contracts are optimal. 
5In some surveys, the agent's type is of more than two types or is drawn from a continuous distri-
bution. However, the discrete two-type model here turns out to be sufficient to highlight the effect 
on investment incentive without having to deal with the technicalities of the other characterization 
of types. 
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match the taste of the audience. I assume the manager's effort level, denoted bye, 
can be either high (H) or low (L), i.e. e E {H,L}. It costs the manager H to exert 
high effort and zero to exert low effort, where H > 0. The effort cost does not merely 
apply to the fixed compensation of an artist, but to any costs that are necessary to 
reveal an artist's charisma. It could be the costs of mentoring, the expenditures on 
advertising, or the salary of a movie crew to crystallize a raw idea into a full-blown 
creation, to give a few examples. The team's odd of success depends on both A's 
type and M's effort, i.e. p = p( t, e). Table 1 summarizes the notation. I also assume 
that, both because it is realistic and it is a standard assumption in the literature, 
effort e is observable by both the manager and the artist but not verifiable by a third 
party. 
Artist (A) type high (h) 
type low (l) 
Manager (M) 
high effort (H) low effort ( L) 
I ::::: I 
PLh 
PLl 
TABLE 1. The odds of success of the team. 
Likely in practice, it matters whether or not the manager makes an effort to 
match the artists with the right set of jobs, or whether or not the manager devotes 
effort to repackage the artist to the point where the public is more likely to appreciate. 
his potential. Artists and jobs were like left and right shoes, the manager can make 
a profit by selling the correct pair. For instance, the box office of the Batman series 
may flop if Heath Ledger was asked by his manager to perform a small villain instead 
of the Joker, or when the costumes of the characters were designed by an amateur 
team instead of a professional one. Similarly, a creative product's value perceived by 
the consumers generally increases with the artist's type. Thus hiring more popular 
talents usually improves the overall success of the performance. For example, think 
of Pretty Woman (Garry Marshall, 1990). Would you have enjoyed this classical 
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romantic comedy as much with an anonymous couple instead of Richard Gere and 
Julia Roberts? Unlikely, since a film is difficult to succeed if the main characters 
cannot thrill his audience. Therefore, I assume that M's effort makes a difference, 
i.e. PHh > PLh and PHl > PLl; similarly, A's type makes a difference, i.e. PHh > PHl 
and PLh > PLl· 
Complementarity between the artist's type and the manager's effort is important 
and quite likely to arise in the entertainment industry. Faulkner and Anderson 
(1987) found that managers and artists who accumulate history of success tend to 
collaborate at a higher frequency. Therefore, I assume that effort and type interact 
multiplicatively rather than additively in determining a creative product's success. 
In other words, a manager's high effort interacting with a high-type talent generates 
more incremental value than if it was to interact with a low-type talent. Similarly, a 
high-type talent interacting with a manager's high effort generates more incremental 
value than if it was to interact with a manager's low effort. These would lead to the 
following: 
ASSUMPTION 1: PHh - PLh > PHl - PLl > 0. 
ASSUMPTION 2: PHh - PHl > PLh - PLl > 0. 
3 One-Period Game 
3.1 Revenue Share 
I begin with a benchmark case of one-period contract. Here, I do not presume the 
existence of strategic interaction between the manager and the artist. The setting 
here resembles that of a one-armed bandit problem, under which a player tries to 
optimize his reward while improving his information at the same time. For instance, 
a gambler has to decide which arm of K different slot machines to choose through 
8 
iterative pulls so as to maximize his payoff. The easiest way to solve a bandit problem 
is to choose the arm with the highest Gittins index in each period, but it is difficult 
to yield analytical solution for such problem. On the contrary, my model takes this 
idea as the starting point for the analysis of revenue share and contract duration in 
the show business and generates a number of interesting implications.6 Nevertheless, 
I will address the issue of bargaining more fully in Section 5. 
Consider a contract after a cut of x E [0, 1] is successfully negotiated, where 
x represents the share of total revenue the manager can get. The game proceeds 
through two steps: first, the manager chooses his first-period effort, either H or L, 
without knowing the artist's type. Instead, he believes that the artist is of type h 
with probability A and the artist is of type l with probability 1 - A. Second, the 
artist takes a first-period productive action, which the outcome depends on his talent 
and the manager's first-period effort. If successful, the team generates revenue of 1; 
otherwise, they have zero revenue. 
To analyze the effect of revenue share on investment incentive, I examine the 
benchmark case with and without a cut in turn. Intuitively, the incentive to exert 
high effort decreases with a revenue share because given a cut of x, the manager has 
to bear all the cost of investment, while he is only rewarded partially. 
Proposition 1. Under any one-period contract with a uniform cut of x < 1, 
there exists a non-empty set of {.A,H,PHh,PHl ,PLh,PLz} such that the investment 
incentive of the manager is lowered. 
Proof. The expected profit of the team if the manager chooses Hand L respec-
tively is 
H: APHh + (1 - -A)PHl - H, (1.1) 
6 A recent related literature, Bergemann and Valimaki (1996) , also built on the bandit framework 
and studied the division of surplus in an uncertain environment. 
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(1.2) 
To maximize the team's expected profit the manager will choose H if and only 
if (1.1) > (1.2): 
A(PHh - PLh) + (1 - )..)(PHl - PLt) 2 H. (1.3) 
Suppose a cut of x is introduced, the manager receives x and the artist receives 
1- x. The expected payoffs of the manager for choosing H and L respectively become 
H: AXPHh + (1 - A)XPHl- H, 
L : AXP Lh + (1 - A)XPLl· 
Similarly, the manager will choose H if and only if (1.4) 2 (1.5): 





Inequalities (1.3) and (1.6) suggest that it is optimal for the manager to exert 
high effort when the expected marginal benefit (LHS) is greater than the expected 
marginal cost (RHS). If the manager believes that the artist is likely to be of type 
h, i.e. ).. is close to 1; and if his effort makes a big difference in the odds of success 
for type-h artist, i.e. (PHh - PLh) is large; then it is optimal for the manager to 
choose H. Similarly, this intuition applies to type-l artist. Only when x = 1 would 
inequality (1.3) be equal to (1.6). For any x < 1, inequality (1.6) is more stringent 
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than ( 1. 3), meaning that M is less likely to exert high effort when he is rewarded 
less than the full pie. 
3.2 Implications 
Figure 1 shows inequalities (1.3) and (1.6). Assumption 1 rules out the dark area 
below the 45° line. It is optimal for the manager to exert high effort if the set of 
parameters are above ( 1. 3). A revenue share shifts the set outwards to the area above 
(1.6). Originally, the manager would choose to exert high effort in the vertically 
striped and the grey regions, but he would only choose high effort in the grey region 
after a share is introduced. Consequently, there exists a deterioration of investment 
incentive when parametric restrictions fall in the vertically striped area. Here, the 
manager is more likely to exert low effort on the talent in the case with a share. 
The result should not be surprising. The manager only receives a share of the 
future gains, while he has to bear all the effort costs; hence, he may not have enough 
incentive to invest in the artist. Alternatively, the deterioration in investment incen-
tive may also stem from the fact that managers would like to avoid the uncertainty in 
trying to distinguish the good talents from the bad talents ex ante. As the "nobody 
knows" property shows, the success of a talent is often difficult to predict because 
rather than finding out an artist's type per se, it is more about how it matches the 
public's preferences which is highly uncertain and costly to find out. In other words, 
even though putting high effort may raise the odds of success of the team, the fact 
that the manager has to bear all the risks in investing on the wrong talent would 
lead him to exert low effort instead. Notice that this interpretation may not be 
permissible if the artist also has to invest in the relationship. 7 
7 On earlier analyses of principal-agent problems, where both parties make a specific investment 
in the relationship, see Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). When the agent also 
performs a specific investment, his action will affect the probability distribution of the outcome. A 
major result of this literature is that complementary assets should be owned by the indispensable 
party. 
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4 Two-Period Game 
4.1 Contract Duration 
The above analysis has considered a one-period contract with a uniform share. The 
result is that the manager would likely make less effort than is desirable for the 
whole team in some parameter space. However, contracts can be more complicated 
in reality. 
To improve investment incentive, contracts may specify a non-uniform share, or 
may be of longer duration. The dichotomous outcome prevents us from looking at 
the former, but I will discuss the latter. The conventional wisdom says that a long-
term contract improves investment incentive because the manager has more time to 
reap return from his own effort by locking-in the artist with him for a longer period 
of time. This section extends the model to a two-period game and tries to examine 
whether this argument applies to the "wait-and-see" strategy. 
There are a few assumptions worth stressing. First, same as the one-period model 
above, I assume the contractual game is conditional on an agreement is reached. 
Secondly, I do not presume the existence of share in this game in order to highlight 
the interesting implication of contract duration. That is, assume x = 1. This means 
that the manager cares about the artist as much as the artist cares about himself 
and implies no underinvestment problem. 8 Thirdly, I focus on comparing a series 
of short-term contracts with different managers to a long-term relationship with the 
same manager. A systematic study of some departures, such as the renewal of short-
term contract with the same manager, would be worthwhile, but is out of the scope 
of this paper. Finally, since interest rate plays no important role in my analysis, it 
is assumed to be negligible. In what follows, I index the contracts with a superscript 
8Realistically, talents earn a profit by fulfilling his contract duties. However, to keep the initial 
exploration as simple as possible, I did not treat the case when x < 1. Since this case complicates 
the situation by involving underinvestment problem and efficiency issues. 
12 
STand LT, meaning short-term and long-term respectively. 
I start with a benchmark case of short-term contracts in which there are two 
managers (M E {M1 , M2 } ). One is subsequent to the other. Now, imagine a con-
tractual game that proceeds as in Figure 2. The set of states for these contracts is 
success ( s) or failure (f). M1 signs a one-period contract with A in the first period 
and M2 enters into another one-period contract with A in the second period. For M1 , 
since he and M2 are two separate entities, he could not care less about the expected 
payoff of subsequent contractor. Hence he will choose H over L under condition 
(1.3). The outcome depends on A's type and M1 's effort. As for M2 , he can infer the 
action of M1 based on what he knows about the parameters, he knows whether A has 
succeeded or failed as well as whether M1 has exerted high or low effort in the first 
period. Hence there are four possible information partitions for M2 in the second 
period: w(H, s), w(H, f), w(L, s) and w(L, f). The first term shows the manager's 
first-period level of effort, and the second term tells whether the team is successful 
or not. And he has eight possible strategy profiles S 8T: 
sfT = {S1(H,s) = H,S1(H,f) = L,S1(L,s) = H,S1(L,f) = H} ; 
s~T = {S2(H, s) = H, S2(H, f)= L, S2(L, s) = H, S2(L, f)= L}; 
s~T = {S3(H, s) = L, S3(H, f) = L, S3(L, s) = H, S3(L, f) = H}; 
s~r = {S4(H, s) = L, S4(H, f)= L, S4(L, s) = H, S4(L, f)= L}; 
s~r = {S5(H, s) = H, S5(H, f) = H, S5(L, s) = L, S5(L, f) = H}; 
s~r = {S6(H, s) = H, S6(H, f)= H, S6(L, s) = L, S6(L, f)= L}; 
s~r = {S1(H, s) = L, S1(H, f) = H, S1(L, s) = L, S1(L, f)= H} ; 
s~r = {S8 (H, s) = L, Ss(H, f)= H, Ss(L, s) = L, Ss(L, f)= L}. 
Again, the outcome depends on A's type and M2 's effort. However, the two con-
ditions, S ( H, f) = H and S ( L, s) = L, have contradiction. That is, the condition 
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when the manager puts high effort but the project fails, he will choose high effort in 
the second period; contradicts with that when he puts low effort but the project is 
successful, he will choose low effort in the second period. 9 Therefore s5T to s5T are 
' 4 8 
dominated. 
Next, consider a game after a two-period contract between a pair of manager and 
artist has been enforced. Imagine a contractual game that proceeds as in Figure 3. 
Events take place in the same order as the one-period game, except that the game 
continues for one more period: after observing the artist's first-period performance 
and the manager's first-period effort, the manager updates his belief about the tal-
ent 's type using Bayes' rule and chooses his second-period effort. Then, the artist 
takes a second-period productive action, for which the odds of success depend on his 
talent and the manager's second-period effort. Realistically, the team's probability 
of success in the second period also depends on the manager's first-period effort, 
but I assume away this possibility in order to simplify the problem. In fact, I show 
that by abstracting from this possibility, I am not throwing out the baby with the 
bath-water. Since if I can prove that the traditional perception holds under a stricter 
assumption, it will also be true under a looser context. 
Now, since the same M signs a two-period contract with A, his second-period 
payoff will affect his first-period decision unlike short-term contracts. But similarly, 
M observes whether A has succeeded or failed as well as knows whether he has 
exerted high or low effort in the first period. Hence there are four possible information 
partitions in the second period: w(H, s), w(H, f), w(L, s) and w(L, f). And M has 
the sixteen possible strategy profiles sLT_ Namely, 
sfr = {H;S1(H,s) = H,S1(H,f) = L,S1(L,s) = H,S1(L,f) = H} ; 
s~r = {L; S2(H, s) = H, S2(H, f)= L, S2(L, s) = H, S2(L, f)= H} ; 
9The verification is in Appendix A, pp. 30- 31. 
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sfT = {H;S3(H,s) = H,S3(H,f) = L,S3(L,s) = H,S3(L,f) = L}; 
sfT = { L; S4(H, s) = H, S4(H, f) = L, S4(L, s) = H, S4(L, f) = L }; 
sfT = {H;Ss(H,s) = L,Ss(H,f) = L,Ss(L,s) = H,Ss(L,f) = H}; 
s~T = {L;S6(H,s) = L,S6(H,f) = L,S6(L,s) = H,S6(L,f) = H}; 
sfT = {H;S1(H,s) = L,S1(H,f) = L,S1(L,s) = H,S1(L,f) = L}; 
stT = {L; Ss(H, s) = L, Ss(H, f) = L, Ss(L, s) = H, Ss(L, f) = L }; 
stT = {H;S9 (H,s) = H,Sg(H,f) = H,Sg(L,s) = L,Sg(L,f) = H}; 
sfg" = {L;S10(H,s) = H,S10(H,f) = H,S10(L,s) = L,S10(L,f) = H}; 
sf[ = {H; Sn(H, s) = H, Sn(H, f)= H, Sn(L, s) = L, Sn(L, f)= L}; 
sf! = {L;S12(H,s) = H,S12(H,f) = H,S12(L,s) = L,S12(L,f) = L}; 
sfJ = {H; S13(H, s) = L, S13(H, f)= H, S13(L, s) = L, S13(L, f)= H}; 
sf[ = {L; S14(H, s) = L, S14(H, f)= H, S14(L, s) = L, S14(L, f)= H}; 
sf[ = {H;Sls(H,s) = L,Sls(H,f) = H,Sls(L,s) = L,Sls(L,f) = L}; 
sf[ = {L;S16(H,s) = L,S16(H,f) = H,B16(L,s) = L,S16(L,f) = L}. 
However, again, because S(H, f) = Hand S(L, s) = L have contradiction, stT to 
sfl are dominated. 
Note that there is a possible debate on the informational difference between the 
two second-period managers that signed different contract duration. Under short-
term contract, M2 can infer the action taken by M1 based on what he knows about the 
parameters, and hence yielding the same information set as the manager under long-
term contract. But the study of M2 's strategy profiles is out of scope in this paper 
because of two reasons. First, our analysis focuses on the first period. Second, M1 
does not care about M2 under short-term arrangement, while longer-term contractor 
does take into account his expected payoff in both periods. 
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Proposition 2. Suppose x = 1. The set of {A , H ,PHh,PHl,PLh,PLl} such that 
the manager will exert less effort in the first period of a two-period contract as com-
pared to when two managers are engaged in subsequent one-period contracts with the 
artist is empty. 
Proof is presented in Appendix A. 
4.2 Implications 
The aim here is to investigate whether a ''wait-and-see" strategy will lower first-
period investment incentive. Under this kind of contract arrangement, a manager will 
exert low effort in the first period and wait for the information of the artist's actual 
performance before choosing his second-period effort. Therefore, in accordance with 
this definition, s~T, sfT, s~T and s~T are "wait-and-see" strategies. In contrary 
to the conventional wisdom, some may argue that a long-term contract allows a 
manager to wait for the arrival of additional information about the artist's type 
from past performance. The longer the duration of contracts, the less costly it is for 
the manager to employ the ''wait-and-see" strategy. Hence, it weakens the manager's 
incentive to exert high effort in early periods of contract term. 
As shown in Appendix A, however, s~T and s~T are dominated. As for sfT and 
s~T, the parameter set under which the manager will employ these "wait-and-see" 
long-term contracts instead of a short-term commitment, and hence put less effort on 
the artist is empty. This reinforces the traditional perception which says long-term 
agreements are more likely to provide the correct ex ante incentive for the manager 
to exert high effort because the artist can less easily expropriate future rent after the 
contract expires. 
In fact, there are two countervailing channels that affect investment incentives. 
First, the "wait-and-see" effect lowers willingness to invest . Second, the manager's 
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second period effort improves willingness to invest. At the start, I have assumed 
away the latter so as to investigate the former channel alone. Now, the "wait-and-
see" effect is proven to be non-existent. The finding should hold even when we 
relax our previous assumption on how time-series effort affect the chance of success 
because the more the effort is count, the higher is the chance of success, and hence 
resulting in non-negative effect on investment incentives. Nevertheless, the study of 
some departures, such as the "wait-and-see" effect under contract arrangement with 
x < 1, might yield different and interesting result. 
5 Two-Sided Game 
5.1 Negotiation of the Share 
The above analysis takes a contract as given and investigates its effects on investment 
incentives. Obviously, the choice of contract is the outcome of a bargaining problem. 
However, I did not treat the bargaining problem explicitly so far. Therefore, this 
section adds the stage the two parties negotiate a share. To make the game more 
realistic, I assume that the artist has private information about his outside oppor-
tunity. This assumption complicates the game because this information will affect 
the artist's acceptance or refusal of contract and ultimately the manager's optimal 
contract proposal. 
Consider a tw~sided game that proceeds as in Figure 4. Here, the manager 
proposes a one-period contract that specifies x E [ 0, 1] , which the artist decides to 
accept or reject based on his outside opportunity, fL E [0, 1]. Assume that fL is private 
information of A and M believes that fL is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. 
For a contract to be accepted, it must yield to each type of artist at least his outside 
option. Once accepted, M will choose either H or L according to his belief of A that 
A is of type h and 1 - A that A is of type l. If successful, the team generates revenue 
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of 1; otherwise they have zero revenue. This bargaining game explains a variety of 
interesting problems in the showbiz world, for example, why novice artists are willing 
to accept a small share; and why artists, on average, cannot work in fields beyond 
the entertainment industry. 
I solve the game in three steps using backward induction: (1) level of effort, 
(2) acceptance or refusal, and (3) optimal contract proposal. In keeping with the 
construction of the previous games, recall from Section 3.1 that M will choose H 
when condition (1.6) is satisfied. Rearranging the terms yields 
If A rejects, the game ends. M and A get zero and fL respectively. If A accepts, 
the game continues and M will choose between H and L in the next stage. For a 
successful agreement, M must offer A an expected payoff that is at least as high as 
the expected payoff that A obtains outside the relationship. Therefore A will accept 
if and only if 
when A anticipates that M will choose H, 
when A anticipates that M will choose L . 
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Or, to put it differently: 
)...PHh + (1 - A)PHl - f-L 
x < -----------------
- APHh + (1 - >.)PHl 
when A anticipates that M will choose H, 
APLh + (1 - >.)PLl - f-L x < ----------------
- APLh + (1 - A)PLl 
when A anticipates that M will choose L. 
On the other hand, M chooses x * to maximize his profit. Anticipating A will 
accept and he will choose H, 
max [>.xpHh + (1- >.)xpHz- H][>-.(1 - x)PHh + (1- >.)(1 - x)pHz ], 
X 
where the first term is his expected payoff and the second term is the probability of 
his proposal being accepted.10 The first-order condition yields 
* 1 H 1 XH = - + > - . 
2 2 [APHh + (1 - >.)pHz] 2 
However, anticipating A will accept and he will choose L, 
max[AXPLh + (1 - A)XPLz][ >-. (1 - x )PLh + (1 - >.)(1 - x)pLzJ· 
X 
10 Assume that p, is uniformly distributed on the domain [0, 1] . 
Therefore, probability of accepting 
= prob[p, ~ .A(1 - x)PHh + (1 - .A)(1 - x )pHz] 
= F(p,)(.A(1 - x)PHh + (1 - .A)(1 - x)pHz] 
>.(1 - x)PHh +(1 - >.) (1 - x )Pm 
~ f(~)d~ 
0 
= .A(1 - x)PHh + (1 - .A)(1 - x)PHl· 
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The first-order condition yields 
* 1 XL=-. 
2 
Define {!2 as the level of share under which the manager is indifferent between 
exerting high or low effort, i.e. x = .\( )+g .\)( ) . Define x as the level 
- PHh - PLh - PHl - PLl 
of share under which the artist is indifferent between accepting or refusing the man-
' al . - APHh+(l - A)PHl - J-L Th .c 'f * - . t ager s propos , 1.e. x = APHh+(l - .\)PHt • ere1ore, 1 {!2 < xH < x 1s proven o 
be true, then there exists a profit-maximizing contract, under which the artist will 
accept a proposal of 1 - x < ~ and the manager will exert high effort. Figure 6 
illustrates this construction. Intuitively, A is willing to accept 1 - x < ~ because he 
knows that M only exerts high effort when M's share is larger than one-half. 
Proposition 3. Under any one-period contract, there exists a non-empty set of 
{J.L , A, H , PHh, PHl, PLh, PLl} such that the artist is willing to accept a contract arrange-
ment with 1 - x < ~ and the manager will exert high effort. 
Proof is presented in Appendix B. 
5.2 Implications 
As illustrated, there exist some one-period contracts, under which the manager will 
extract a larger revenue share to compensate for his potential loss in investments if 
the talent was to walk off the table in the next period, and the artist expects more 
effort from his manager to compensate for his expected loss in revenue share. A 
surprising implication is that the group of artist that does not necessarily demand 
a large revenue share is those who obtain smaller expected payoff from outside the 
relationship. As illustrated in Appendix B, an artist is willing to accept 1 - x < ~ 
when J.L :::; ~(0.5PHl - 0.05). Even when PHl is close to its upper bound of 0.9, J.L is 
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still smaller than 0. 2.11 
Intuitively, this implication is most suitable for novice artists as they usually have 
small outside opportunity. Since inexperienced talents do not have any history of 
actual performance which the manager can predict from, their success is shrouded 
in mist of uncertainty. Unlike veteran talents who have already achieved "super-
star" status, novice artists do not have the power to ask for more compensation.12 
In essence, specific investments, such as talent development, promotion and other 
supportive services, are more important to them. Therefore, they are willing to give 
up a relatively large part of their pie in exchange for prospective investments. 
5.3 Discussion 
In fact, by comparing the threshold that an artist will accept the manager's proposal 
based on the maximization of his individual gain and that based on the maximiza-
tion of the team's gain, we can say much more about the selection of talents than 
merely that artists are willing to give up part of their earnings for more specific 
investments. Another interesting implication of my model is that if only the artists 
with small outside opportunity would choose to enter this industry, then the enter-
tainment business would be plagued with too many mediocre talents than it should 
be optimally. 
11 Notice that this model intends to prove existence, thus capturing all the parameters that affect 
investment incentive is out of the scope of this paper. I focus on a bare minimum of ambiguous 
parameters, namely PHZ and PLh· For the other parameters, since a high-type talent cooperating 
with a high-effort manager is more likely to be successful and the opposite is more likely to result 
in a failure, I assume that PHh = 0.9 and PLZ = 0.1. To ignore other complications, I also restrict 
H =A= 0.5. 
12 In practice, superstars usually earn a flat rate plus a percentage of the profit. However, new or 
less popular artists only earn a flat rate. 
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Case 1 When M chooses H, 
A will accept iff 
Substituting xH- into this expression and rearranging it yields 
1 
f-L < 2 [APHh + (1 - A)PHl - H]. 
However, to maximize the team's payoff, A should accept when 
Case 2 When M chooses L, 
A will accept iff 
Substituting x£ into this expression and rearranging it yields 
1 
f-L :::; 2 [A p Lh + ( 1 - A) p Ll] . 
However, to maximize the team's payoff, A should accept when 
f-L :::; A p Lh + ( 1 - ,\) p Ll· 
Both cases show that the team will be better off if artists with larger outside 
opportunity would enter the show business. In fact, low investment incentive of 
the manager may be one of the culprits that caused the employment of excessive 
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mediocrities. When 1-1 > 0, an artist demands a positive share of 1 - x because 
x < 1. Recall proposition 1 that says the manager is less likely to exert high effort 
under a one-period contract with uniform cut of x < 1. In that case, we might expect 
to see better skilled talents in this industry if the manager was to make more effort 
in manufacturing the artist's image. Evidently, many of the top-tiered artists such 
as Tom Cruise, Brad Pitt, Johnny Depp, Meryl Streep, Julia Roberts, etc. come 
from the Hollywood studio. The key to success is that this entertainment factory 
is making an effort to bring out the uniqueness of these artists. Indeed, have you 
ever seen two Tom Cruise? However, if the manager does not make an effort to 
distinguish his artist, it is conceivable that the better talent would prefer to stay out 
of the industry since no one would want to be too easily replaceable, especially when 
it comes down to creative product. 
Variation in contract duration is a potential solution to excessive mediocrities 
in the entertainment workforce, as it might change investment incentives. Likely in 
practice, creative product such as films requires inputs from several artists. How-
ever, it is clear that one artist's talent differs from another's and matches the job 
to a different degree. Myopic implementation of long-term commitments may create 
drawbacks such as a manager being stuck with a burned-out artist or a manager 
underspending on an artist who achieves great success. Therefore, enforcing an effi-
cient contract length with different artists is likely to economize production costs and 
reduce outside opportunity losses associated with completing a project. I conjecture, 
then, that a suitable choice of contract length might not only enhance investment 
incentive, but might also reduce inefficiency brought about by excessive mediocri-
ties.13 
13 Notice that this conjecture should be viewed as merely suggestive as I did not attempt any 
systematic analysis of possible solutions. Further researches will be needed to generate a set of 
testable hypotheses. 
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6 Conclusion and Ideas for Future Research 
This paper studies a simple two-period contracting model portraying the showbiz 
world. The leitmotifs are to formally incorporate the ''nobody knows" property 
as well as to study the relationship between investment incentive and important 
provisions of contract such as revenue share and contract duration. I list my main 
results in the following. 
• Revenue share may deteriorate incentive to invest. The logic underlying this 
result is simple. Since the manager only receives a share of the future gains, 
he may not have enough incentive to exert high effort at the ex ante stage. 
Alternatively, as a talent's success is often difficult to predict ex ante, the 
manager would opt for low effort so that he could avoid the risk in investing 
on the wrong talent. 
• I find the effect of employing ''wait-and-see" strategy on first-period invest-
ment incentive is consistent with the conventional wisdom. Indeed, long-term 
contracts help improving investment incentive because locking-in the artist 
for longer time prevents him from expropriating the manager's specific invest-
ments. 
• The manager demands a greater revenue share for his willingness to exert 
high effort, and the artist is willing to accept a smaller revenue share as he 
prefers compensation by more specific investments than compensation from 
larger revenues. This captures a characteristic feature of the showbiz world in 
which specific investments are a crucial consideration of the early career of an 
artist. It also confirms the stylized fact about why artists, on average, cannot 
work in fields beyond the world of entertainment. Last but not least , the 
enforcement of efficient contract duration is suggested to rectify the situation. 
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Although this model is a mere skeleton at this moment, I hope the results of this 
simple exercise shed some solace on the complex structure of actual contracts in the 
showbiz world. Given the importance of specific investments, there are obviously 
many aspects of contracting not discussed in this paper. For instance, I find for any 
period of the game, the artist is paid a lump-sum, while the manager keeps 100% of 
the revenue; this kind of contract is expected to be optimal when one-sided moral 
hazard problem is observed and the manager is risk-neutral. For a longer-term game, 
however, the manager usually has the right to "sell" the artist to another manager, 
who may have greater ability in bringing out a bigger mru::ket for the artist. The 
artist is expected to earn a higher salary by transferring him to another manager. 
The detour is worthwhile for one often observes loan-out deals in entertainment 
industry. 
Furthermore, I have not fully explored the two-sided game. When the bargaining 
game is extended to two-period, after the first short-term contract expires, the two 
parties may renegotiate the deal. If the talent becomes popular in the first period, 
he may sometimes pressure the manager to sweeten the deal. In that case, they will 
compromise on a new contract, under which the artist will receive a larger share. 
For instance, refer to the contractual game depicted in Figure 5. The study of this 





Proof of Proposition 2. 
The manager is assumed to act so as to maximize the team's expected profit. 
It is also assumed that the success of outcome depends on a random assignment of 
the type of talent by the state of nature and the effort level of the manager in that 
period. Given PHh = [0, 1], PLh = [0, 1], PHl = [0, 1], PLl = [0, 1], H = [0, 1] and 
,\ = [ 0, 1]. Recall assumptions 1 and 2. 
PHh- PLh > PHl - PLl > 0. 
PHh- PHl > PLh - PLl > 0. 




Let us first consider a two-period game that consists of two short-term contracts 
signed with two different managers: M2 is subsequent to M1 . It is assumed that 
these contracts stipulate x = 1. Imagine a contractual game that proceeds as in 
Figure 2. M1 will not worry about the payoff of M2 because they are two separate 
entities. So M1 's first-period expected profit of choosing H and L respectively is 
AP Hh + (1 - A)PHl - H, 
Note that, throughout the Appendix, conditions labeled with (H) indicate that 
the manager will choose to exert high effort, and conditions labeled with (L) suggest 
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otherwise. Thus, M1 will choose H if and only if 
>..(PHh- PLh) + (1- >..)(PHz- PLz)- H > 0. (ST.lH) 
Long-term Contracts 
Let us now consider a two-period game that consists of one long-term contract 
signed with one manager only. It is assumed that this contract stipulates x = 
1. Imagine a contractual game that proceeds as in Figure 3. Under this contract 
enforcement, M knows his own effort level in the previous period as well as whether 
A has been successful or not. He has four information sets: w(H, s), w(H, f), w(L, s) 
and w(L, f); and hence sixteen strategy profiles. Namely, 
sfr = {H;S1(H,s) = H,S1(H,f) = L,S1(L,s) = H,S1(L,f) = H}; 
s~T = { L; S2(H, s) = H, S2(H, f) = L, S2(L, s) = H, S2(L, f) = H}; 
sfT = {H;S3(H,s) = H,S3(H,f) = L,S3(L,s) = H,S3(L,f) = L}; 
sfT = {L; S4(H, s) = H, S4(H, f)= L, S4(L, s) = H, S4(L, f)= L}; 
sfT = {H;S5(H,s) = L,S5(H,f) = L,S5(L,s) = H,S5(L,f) = H}; 
s~T = {L; S6(H, s) = L, S6(H, f)= L, S6(L, s) = H, S6(L, f)= H}; 
sfT = {H; S1(H, s) = L, S1(H, f)= L, S1(L, s) = H, S7(L, f)= L} ; 
s~T = {L;S8 (H,s) = L,Ss(H,f) = L,Ss(L,s) = H,Ss(L,f) = L}; 
s~T = {H;S9 (H,s) = H,S9 (H,f) = H,S9 (L,s) = L,Sg(L,f) = H}; 
sfl = {L; S10(H, s) = H, S10(H, f)= H, S10(L, s) = L, S10(L, f)= H} ; 
sf[ = {H; Sn(H, s) = H, Sn(H, f)= H, Sn(L, s) = L, Sn(L, f)= L} ; 
sfJ = {L; S12(H, s) = H, S12(H, f)= H, S12(L, s) = L, S12(L, f)= L} ; 
sfJ = {H; S13(H, s) = L, S13(H, f)= H, S13(L, s) = L, S13(L, f)= H}; 
sf[ = {L; S14(H, s) = L, S14(H, f)= H, S14(L, s) = L, S14(L, f)= H} ; 
sf[ = {H; S15(H, s) = L, S15(H, f)= H, S15(L, s) = L, S15(L, f)= L} ; 
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sf[ = {L;S16(H,s) = L,S16(H,f) = H,B16(L,s) = L,S16(L,j) = L}. 
To elaborate, after observing w(H, s), the expected profit of M if he chooses H 
and L respectively is 
[ APHh J 
-AP_H_h_+_( -1 - -A-)P_H_l p Hh 
+[ (1 - A)PHl ]PHl - H, 
APHh + (1- A)PHl 
[ APHh ] 
-AP_H_h_+_ ( 1---A-)P_H_l p Lh 
[ (1 - A)PHl ] + PLl· APHh + (1 - A)PHl 
Rearranging and simplifying the expression, M will choose H if and only if 
(LT.1H) 
Mter observing w(L, f), the expected profit of M if he chooses Hand L respec-
tively is 
[ A(1- PLh) J 
-A (_1_P_L_h)_+_( 1--A- )-( 1_ P_L_l) p Hh 
[ ( 1 - A) ( 1 - p LI) J H + PHl - ' A(1 - PLh) + (1 - A)(1 - PLl) 
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Rearranging and simplifying the expression, M will choose H if and only if 
(LT.2H) 
After observing w ( H, f), the expected profit of M if he chooses H and L respec-
tively is 
[ A(1 - PHh) J 
-A(_1 ___ P_H_h_)+--(1----A-)(_1 ___ P_H_z)PHh 
[ (1- A)(1 - Psz) J H + PHl - ' A(1- PHh) + (1- A)(1 - Psz) 
[ .\(1 - PHh) J 
-A (_1 ___ P_H_h_) -+-( 1----A-) (-1- -P-H-l) p Lh 
[ (1 - A)(1 - psz) ] + PU· A(1 - Psh) + (1 - A)(1 - Psz) 
Rearranging and simplifying the expression, M will choose L if and only if 
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(LT.3H) 
After observing w( L, s), the expected profit of M if he chooses H and L respec-
tively is 
Rearranging and simplifying the expression, M will choose H if and only if 
(LT.4H) 
Here, s~T to sfl are dominated because (LT.3H) contradicts (LT.4L). Combine 
them into 
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Rearranging and simplifying the expression, we obtain 
.\(1 - .\) [pLz(1 - PHh) - PLh(1 - PHz)] [(PHh- PLh) - (PHl- PLz)] 
[.\(1- PHh) + (1- .\)(1 - PHz)] [APLh + (1 - .\)pLz] > O. 
However, the numerator should be negative because p Ll < p Lh and 1 - p Hh < 
1 - p Hl· Therefore, I only proceed to examine the first-period conditions of sfT to 
S LT 8 • 
In the first period, the expected profit of M if he chooses H and L under sfT 
respectively is 
.\[pHh(1 + PHh- H)+ (1 - PHh)(PLh)] 
+(1- .\) [pHz(1 + PHl- H)+ (1 - PHz)(PLz)] - H, 
.\[pLh(1 + PHh- H)+ (1 - PLh)(PHh- H)] 
+(1- A)[pLz(1 + PHl- H)+ (1 - PLz)(PHl - H)]. 
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Simplifying the expression yields condition (LT .lH) exactly. Therefore, M will 
choose H in the first period under sfT if and only if (LT .lH) is satisfied, while s~T 
requires (LT .lL). 
Similarly, the first period expected profit of M if he chooses Hand L under sfT 
respectively is 
A[pHh(l + PHh - H)+ (1 - PHh)(PLh)] 
+(1 - -\)[pHl(1 + PHl - H)+ (1 - PHL)(PLL) ]- H, 
A[pLh(1 + PHh - H)+ (1 - PLh)(PLh) ] 
+(1 - -\) [PLl(1 + PHl - H)+ (1 - PLL)(PLL)] · 
Therefore, M will choose H in the first period nnder sfT if and only if 
-\(1 + PHh - PLh) ( ) 
--\-( 1_+_ P_H_h _ P___:_Lh)_+_ (_1 ___ -\_)_( 1_+_P_H_l _P_L_l) p Hh - p Lh 
+ 
(1 - -\)(1 + PHl - PLl) ( ) > H 
( ) ( ')( ) PHl - PLl _ , A 1 + PHh - PLh + 1 - A 1 + PHl - PLl (LT.5H) 
while s£T requires the opposite. 
In the same way, the first period expected profit of M if he chooses . H and L 
under stT respectively is 
A[pHh(1 + PLh) + (1 - PHh)(PLh)] 
+(1 - -\)[pHl(1 + PLl) + (1 - PHL)(PLL)] - H , 
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.\[pLh(1 + PHh- H)+ (1 - PLh)(PHh- H)] 
+(1- .\)[pLl(1 + PHl- H)+ (1 - PLl)(PHl- H)]. 
Therefore, M will choose H in the first period under sfT if and only if 
1 2:: 1, (LT.6H) 
while s~T requires the opposite. 
Finally, the first period expected profit of M if he chooses H and L under sfT 
respectively is 
.\[pHh(1 + PLh) + (1- PHh)(PLh)] 
+(1- .\)[pHl(1 + PLl) + (1- PHl)(PLl)]- H, 
.\[pLh(1 + PHh- H)+ (1 - PLh)(PLh)] 
+(1- .\)[pLl(1 + PHl- H)+ (1 - PLL)(pLL)]. 
Simplifying the expression yields condition (LT.2H) exactly. Therefore, M will 
choose H in the first period under sfT if and only if (LT.2H) is satisfied, while st T 
requires (LT.2L). 
To summarize M can choose SLT SLT SLT SLT SLT SLT SLT or SLT 
' 1' 2' 3' 4' 5' 6' 7 8 • 
sfT needs to satisfy conditions (LT.1H) and (LT.2H); 
sfT needs to satisfy conditions (LT.1H), (LT.2H) and (LT.1L); 
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sfT needs to satisfy conditions (LT.lH), (LT.2L) and (LT.5H); 
sfT needs to satisfy conditions (LT.lH), (LT.2L) and (LT.5L); 
sfT needs to satisfy conditions (LT.lL), (LT.2H) and (LT.6H); 
stT needs to satisfy conditions (LT.lL), (LT.2H) and (LT.6L); 
s~T needs to satisfy conditions (LT.lL), (LT.2L) and (LT.2H); 
s~T needs to satisfy conditions (LT.lL) and (LT.2L). 
Additionally, all of them require (LT.3L) and (LT.4H). 
Among these strategy profiles, only s~T, sfT, stT and s~T are "wait-and-see" 
strategies. Furthermore, as the necessary conditions of s~T and stT are contradictory, 
these two strategy profiles are dominated. Thus, there remains sfT and s~T only. 
Non-Existence 
Suppose the manager chooses low effort under long-term contract instead of high 
effort under short-term contract in the first period, then he can only pick between 
sfT and s~T. Switching from any short-term contracts to sf T, the existence of 
Proposition 2 means (A.l), (A.2), (ST.lH), (LT.lH), (LT.2L) and (LT.5L) must 
yield a non-empty set. Combining (ST.lH) and (LT.5L) gives 
A ( 1 + p Hh - p Lh) ( ) 
--------------- PHh - PLh 
A(1 + PHh - PLh) + (1 - A)(1 + PHl - PLz) 
( 1 - A) ( 1 + p Hl - p Ll ) ( ) 
+ PHl - PLl A(1 + PHh - PLh) + (1 - A)(1 + PHl - PLl) 
< A(PHh - PLh) + (1 - A)(PHz - PLz). 
Simplifying the expression, we immediately obtain 
(PHh - PHl - PLh + PLz) 2 (A - 1)A 0 
(PLl - 1) - PHl - A[(PHh - PLh) - (PHl - PLl)] < . 
However, the numerator is negative as A = [0, 1], and the denominator is negative 
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because of ( A.l). Therefore LHS should be positive, which contradicts the above 
expression. 
Similarly, switching to s~T, the existence of Proposition 2 means (A.l), (A.2), 
(ST.lH), (LT.lL) and (LT.2L) must yield a non-empty set. Combining (ST.lH) and 
(LT.lL) gives 
< A(PHh - PLh) + (1 - A)(PHl - PLl) - H. 
Simplifying, we immediately obtain 
A (1 - A) (PHh - PHl)[(PHh - PLh) - (PHl - PLl) ] < 0 
PHl + A(PHh - PHl) . 
However, both the numerator and the denominator are positive because of (A.l) 
and (A.2). Therefore LHS should be positive, which contradicts the above expression. 
Hence, I proved Proposition 2. 
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Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Consider a contractual game that proceeds as in Figure 4. Different from the 
previous games is that the bargaining stage is reinstated. Since a high-type talent 
cooperating with a high-effort manager is more likely to be successful and the oppo-
site is more likely to result in a failure, I assume that PHh = 0.9 and PLl = 0.1. It is 
also obvious that the chance of success is likely to be hurt if a high-effort manager 
(high-type artist) was to be teamed with a low-type (low-effort) counterpart, but 
not as hurt as compared to a low-low combination. Therefore, assumption 1 breaks 
up into 
0.1 < PLh < 0.9, 
0.1 < PHl < 0.9, 
PLh + PHl < 1. 




Imposing these parameter restrictions as well as x E [0, 1] and J-L E [0, 1] into the 
expressions in Section 5.1 yields the following. M will choose H if and only if 
0.5 
x> ----------------
- 0.5pHl - 0.5pLh + 0.4 
A will accept if and only if 
0.5pHl + 0.45 - f-1, 
X < -------------
- 0.5pHl + 0.45 
when A anticipates that M will choose H, 
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0.5p Lh + 0.05 - J-L 
x< -------
- 0.5pLh + 0.05 
when A anticipates that M will choose L. 
M chooses x * to maximize his profit. Anticipating A will accept and he will 
choose H, i.e. when x = [>.( )+~ >.)( ) , 1], PHh - PLh - PHl - PLl 
max[x(0.5PHl + 0.45) - 0.5](1 - x)(0.5PHl + 0.45). 
X 
The profit function is strictly concave because a;:: < 0 for all p Hl and it cuts 
the x-axis at 10P~t+9 and 1. The first-order condition yields 
* 10PHl + 19 
XH= . 
20PHl + 18 
Therefore, the expected profit of the manager exerting high effort at xH- is 
E( 1f1Jj) = 0.062 5p~l - 0.012 5PHl + 6. 25 X 10- 4 . 
However, anticipating A will accept and he will choose L, i.e. when 
maxx(1 - x)(0. 5PLh + 0.05)2 . 
X 
The profit function is strictly concave because a;:r < 0 for all PLh and it cuts 
the x-axis at 0 and 1. The first-order condition yields 
* 1 XL= - . 
2 
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Therefore, the expected profit of the manager exerting low effort at x£ is 
E(7rlf) = 0.062 5p'ih + 0.012 5PLh + 6. 25 X 10- 4 . 
Recall from Section 5.1 that if ~ < xfi < x is proven to be true, then there exists 
a profit-maximizing contract, under which the artist is willing to accept a proposal 
of 1 - x < ~ and M will exert high effort.14 Figure 6 illustrates this construction. 
For the manager to exert high effort, it is necessary to have 
X~>~· (B.1) 
Expressing this condition in terms of p Hl and p Lh yields 
3. 5PHl - 9. 5PLh - 5.0pHlPLh + 5.0p~l - 1. 4 > 0. 
When necessary condition (B.1) is satisfied, the manager will propose xfi = 
~~~~~!~~, which is necessarily larger than one-half. This implies that if A wants M 
to exert high effort, he can only realize it by accepting a share smaller than one-half. 
For the artist to accept such proposal, it is necessary to have 
xfi <x. (B.2) 
At this point, it is impossible to express (B.2) in terms of PHl and PLh only, as the 
range off-Lis yet to be determined. Therefore, the next step is to find the threshold 
level of outside opportunity that A will accept xfi. That is, 
14 In this case, the lower bound share under which the manager is indifferent between exerting 
exert high and low effort is redefined as ;f. = 0 5 _ g·~ +O 4 ; and the upper bound share under 
· PHI · Pj-h · 
which the artist is indifferent between accepting and retusing the manager 's proposal is redefined 
as x _ o.5pHL+0.45 - e 
- 0.5pHL+0.45 
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Substituting xH into this expression and rearranging it yields 
1 2 [APHh + (1- .A)PHl- H] 2:: J-L. 
Because PHh = 0.9, H = ,\ = 0.5 and 0.1 < PHl < 0.9, 
1 
J-L < 2(0.5psl- 0.05). (B.3) 
To prove proposition 3, we need to find a non-empty set of {J-L , .-\ , H , PHh, PHl, PLh, PLl} 
that satisfies assumptions (A.5) to (A.7) and necessary conditions (B.1) to (B.3). Let 
J-L = 0.1. Then, expressing (B.2) in terms of p Hl and p Lh yields 
5p~l + 2psl - 2.25 > 0. 
Figure 7 illustrates the parameter space of p Hl and p Lh that satisfies ( A.3) to 
(A.5) and (B.1) to (B.3). For instance, if PLh = 0.2, then PHl = (0.6, 0.8), and hence 
I proved Proposition 3. 
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